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ARTICLES
MENTAL ILLNESS:
A LEGAL FICTION
James H. Hardisty*
INTRODUCTION
The law has long kept "mental illness" in its back wards. An exam-
ination of the term "mental illness" and its synonyms is overdue. The
treatment of choice may be to discharge the concept of "mental ill-
ness" from further retention by the law.
Previous publications have discussed the problems of defining the
term "mental illness" (or the virtually synonymous "mental disease")
when it appears in legal tests.' But this article furnishes the first explor-
ation of the consequences resulting from such legal incorporation of
the phrase "mental disease." Unlike earlier proposals that we jettison
one or more of the legal standards in which "mental disease" appears, 2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Harvard, 1963;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1966. 1 wish to thank my colleague, Lawrence H. Schwartz,
M.D., and my wife, Elizabeth Hardisty, for giving me helpful comments on a draft of
this article.
1. See, e.g., H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 19-52 (1972);
Hardisty, Insanity as a Divorce Defense, 12 J. FAM. L. 1, 5-11 (1972); Swartz, "Mental
Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 389 (1963); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1960).
2. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 109, 113 (1970); Burt & Morris, A
Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 66 (1972);
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 YALE LI. 853
(1963); Hardisty, Insanity as a Divorce Defense, 12 J. FAM. L. 1 (1972). Similarly, the
new proposal of the Nixon administration abolishes the "insanity defense" as that phrase
traditionally has been used (id. at 16-17) and substitutes therefor a provision excul-
pating defendants who "as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind
required as an element of the offense charged." S. 1400, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess. § 502
(1973).
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this is the first article to suggest that we retain the legal standards but
drop from them the words "mental disease. ' 3 Such semantic alterations
would not necessarily involve substantial changes in the types of per-
sons found incompetent, criminally irresponsible or committable. Nor
would they necessarily modify which individuals are sent to which insti-
tutions. However, they would help to rationalize psychiatric-legal pro-
ceedings and to reduce the confusion in communications and roles
among psychiatrists, lawyers, judges, juries and clients.
The article will first examine the nebulousness of "mental disease"
as a psychiatric, social and legal term. Then it will discuss a few of the
"mental disease" legal rules. Finally it will analyze and evaluate the
functions that "mental disease" performs as a legal term.
This article does not consider what additional changes, if any,
should be made in various legal standards if the term "mental disease"
were deleted from them. Such discussion is beyond the scope of this
article, as it would require a separate, detailed analysis of each such
incapacity standard and its purposes.
I. BORROWING "MENTAL DISEASE"
Many judges and commentators believe that in using the term
"mental disease," the law embraces a medical concept. 4 If true, this
would furnish an example of the law's inertia in the face of change
because the law would be embracing an obsolete nineteenth century
concept. In the nineteenth century, physicians employed the term "in-
sanity" to refer to a physical disease of the brain.5 They believed the
strange hallucinations and emotions of the "insane" were caused or
accompanied by anatomical or physiological changes in the "insane"
brain.
3. But cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972), infra note
60.
4. See, e.g., State v. Crose, 88 Ariz. 389, 357 P.2d 136, 138 (1960); Weihofen, The
Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1960).
The discussion in this article of the meaning of "mental disease" in nonlegal contexts
will be summary since the subject has been adequately covered elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Redlich, The Concept of Normality, 6 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 551 (1952); T. SZASZ, THE
MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the
Light of American Values and Social Structure, PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS AND ILLNESS 165
(E. Jaco ed. 1958). For a more extensive discussion of the medical usage of "mental dis-
ease" by the present author, see Hardisty, Insanity as a Divorce Defense, 12 J. FAM. L.
1, 2-5 (1972).
5. N. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1789-1865 16. 26, 64. 70
(1964); I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838).
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When the courts and legislators of that era employed such words as
"insanity" or "mental disease," they adopted the medical usage. 6 For
example, the 1890 Washington State civil commitment statutes em-
ployed "insanity" to refer to a medical disease.7 Similarly, New
Hampshire treated the existence of criminal insanity as a question of
medical fact.8 This medical definition of criminal insanity was at least
understandable when physicians still believed medical "insanity" had
a physical referent.
But the "medical fact" approach to insanity makes no sense in
modem legal usage since psychiatrists have abandoned it. Physicians
no longer speak of "insanity."9 In its place they use "psychosis" or
potentially broader terms such as "mental disease, .... mental illness,"
"emotional illness," "mental derangement" or "mental disorder." Al-
though these terms seem to assume an identifiable underlying abnor-
mality, physicians do not now believe they have any definite refer-
rents. In fact, psychiatrists generally have concluded that such phrases
as "mental illness" are relatively useless as medical terms.10 Psychia-
trists still employ the words "mental illness" but do so not to describe
a medical condition but rather to achieve social purposes.1
6. See, e.g., Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94, 105-106 (1879), Denny v. Tyler, 85 Mass. (3
Allen) 225, 227-28 (1861); In re Crosswell's Petition, 28 R.I. 137, 66 A. 55, 58 (1907).
7. "[Two reputable] physicians shall ... certify to the ... premonitory symptoms
apparent cause and class of insanity, duration of the disease and present condition."
(The statute then provides for commitment if the "insanity" is of a recent, curable or
dangerous nature.) Act of March 13, 1890, § 16, [1889-1890] Wash. Sess. Laws 486
repealed 1959).
8. See Stite v. Jones, 50 N.H. 399 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); I. RAY,
A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 39 (5th ed. 1871); Reik, The
Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental
Disease, 63 YALE L.i. 183 (1953).
9. "Insanity" is a "vague, legal term for the psychotic state, now obsolete in psychi-
atric usage." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 39 (2d ed.
1964).
10. See, e.g., Redlich, The Concept of Normality, 6 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 551-56
(1952). See also the following quotation from a concurring opinion by now Chief Jus-
tice Burger:
So distinguished an authority as Dr. Philip Q. Roche, ... said as recently as 1958:
"I will say there is neither such a thing as "insanity" nor such a thing as "mental
disease".... To the psychiatrist the mental illness can have a meaning only in the
sense of what in the future will be done to or ivith the patient to relieve him and
those around him."
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
11. E.g., T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 21-36 (1961).
Many psychologists and sociologists, in particular, see the phrase "mental disease" as
part of a misleading medical model based on an inappropiate analogy to physical dis-
ease. They believe the medical mbdel aids medically trained professionals such as psy-
chiatrists in maintaining their dominance over part of the field of behavioral deviancy.
See, e.g., T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 14, 25-26 (1966);
737
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Thus "mental illness," even though it no longer has an accepted
medical meaning, is not in linguistic limbo. People employ "mental
illness" for its rhetorical power. They use it in achieving social objec-
tives such as suggesting dangerousness 12 and placing the labelled person
in the same social role as the physically ill. When psychiatrists or lay-
men say that either alcoholism or homosexuality is a "disease," they con-
sciously or unconsciously attempt to influence society's reactions to
alcoholics or homosexuals. They are using the label "disease" to make
social, political and moral judgments that society should relegate al-
coholics and homosexuals to the sick role.13 The sociologist Talcott
Parsons sees the mentally sick role as characterized by a disturbance
in a person's capacity to perform other social roles: (1) society pre-
sumes the incapacity, called a sickness, cannot be overcome by will
power and is thus beyond the individual's responsibility; (2) society
exempts the sick individual from his normal role obligations; (3) so-
ciety accepts sickness as a legitimate status if the sick person recog-
nizes it as undesirable and tries to get well; and (4) society assumes the
sick person and his family have an obligation to seek medical help. 14
All of these vague social meanings of mental illness may be more
connotations than denotations. But perhaps "mental illness" can now
best be thought of as a phrase without a denotation. The functions of
the phrase may now lie entirely outside its validity as a descriptive
term. In any event, these connotations have helped shape the meaning
of "mental illness" as adopted by the law and account for much of the
confusion in its legal usage.
Although "insanity" and "mental disease" have died as medical
concepts, their legal ghosts still haunt us. For example, the term
"mental disease" is present in legal insanity defense standards. Simi-
larly, the term is sometimes a part of the various incompetency tests.
The legal concept, which originally was pinned to the historical med-
ical concept, is left with no valid definition in medical terms. Never-
Albee, The Relation of Conceptual Models to Man-power Needs, EMERGENT
APPROACHES TO MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 63, 68-72 (E. Cowen, E. Gardner, M.
Zaz eds., 1967). The term "medical model" itself often seems to be employed as a
counter-rhetorical device which serves to replace rather than to aid analysis. The phrase
will be avoided in the remainder of this article.
12. F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, R. PARNAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED PROCESSES 1541 (1971); T. SCHEFF, BEING
MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 71-74 (1966).
13. Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values and
Social Structure, in PATIENTS. PHYSICIANS AND ILLNESS 165, 166, 176 (E. Jaco ed. 1958).
14. Id. at 176-177.
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theless, courts and legislatures have generally not furnished any legal
definitions of the term 15 except for a few circular ones. 16 Trial judges in
effect instruct juries to determine whether the defendant has a "mental
disease," but leave the term undefined. 17
Many judges and legislators fail to realize that "mental disease" no
longer has an accepted psychiatric meaning.' 8 Thus courts inadver-
tently let each testifying psychiatrist listen to his own drummer in
defining what the law means by "mental disease."'19 In turn, psychi-
atric witnesses often assume that "mental disease" is a legal term since
they know it has no accepted medical meaning. Since the court does
not define it, each such witness assigns his own particular legal
meaning to the term.20 Other psychiatric witnesses attempt to trans-
late "mental disease" into psychiatric jargon, variously assuming that
under the law "mental disease" means anything from psychosis to a
personality disorder such as antisocial personality.21 The lack of con-
sensus follows from the absence of accepted psychiatric guidelines.
The result is a random determination of who is legally "mentally ill."
II. LEGAL STANDARDS CONTAINING
"MENTAL DISEASE"
Despite the lack of agreed-on medical or legal meaning of mental
disease, various legal standards incorporate the term. This section out-
lines the extent to which the phrase "mental disease" and its synonyms
are a part of the legal tests for incompetency and the insanity defense.
By way of background, the explicit inclusion of the term "mental ill-
ness" in such legal tests has certain formal procedural consequences.
Such inclusion technically requires that the trier of fact, whether judge
or jury, find that the allegedly incompetent or irresponsible person
15. A fortiori, the courts have not considered whether the phrase "mental illness"
has different meanings when used in different legal rules.
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 (1967) furnishes a typical example of a circular defi-
nition: "'mental illness' means a psychosis or other disease which substantially impairs
the mental health of a person."
17. See, e.g., Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. 1963).
18. See, e.g., State v. Crose, 88 Ariz. 389, 357 P.2d 136, 138 (1960).
19. See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796, 799-800 (1960);
Hampton v. Hampton, 241 Ore. 277, 405 P.2d 549, 550 (1965); R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER
& H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 43 (1968).
20. Id.
21. Id.; Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862, 865 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 841 (1963); Sherrill v. State, 14 Md. App. 146, 286 A.2d 528 (1972);
Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540, 541 (1965).
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was "mentally ill." Theoretically the fact finder must also ascertain
that this "mental illness" "caused" the incompetency or irrespon-
sibility in question. Before these issues reach the jury in a jury case,
the trial judge must determine that there is enough evidence to
support jury findings on these issues of the existence and causal effects
of "mental illness."'22 On the other hand, all these findings are avoided
if the legal test includes no phrase such as "mental disease," for then
the trier of fact need not find any causeof the incapacity or irresponsi-
bility. Of course, even if no causal finding is required, a psychiatrist
may still testify about an underlying "mental disease" such as "schizo-
phrenia," since such testimony would constitute relevant evidence on
the issue of incompetency or irresponsibility.
Whether "mental disease" is a causal requirement in a legal test is
sometimes unclear. Some of the tests are stated in statutes. Examina-
tion of those statutes indicates if the standards explicitly include a
"mental illness" causal requirement. However, many tests are not cod-
ified. In construing these, the parties and the courts rarely focus on
whether the phrase "mental disease" is a part of the legal standard.
For example, the courts rarely discuss whether the jury instruction on
competency or irresponsibility should contain a causal requirement
such as "mental disease." However, a trial court in instructing juries
often copies the formulation of a legal test employed by its appellate
courts. If a particular legal test of competency as stated by an appel-
late court happens to contain the phrase "mental disease," even if the
court was focusing on some issue other than the causal requirement of
mental disease, then trial courts in that jurisdiction will tend to em-
ploy the same "mental disease" phrase in instructing a jury on the
competency test.
A. Competency Tests
"Competency" covers a wide variety of legal problems and stan-
dards. In each legal area in which a person needs jural capacity, there
is a separate test of his ability to perform the relevant legal act. For
example, there are separate tests for competency to contract, to make
a will, to manage one's person and affairs (guardianship), to sue and
22. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 123 A.2d 461, 464 (Del. 1956). In some courts, compe-
tent evidence of "mental illness" may be sufficient by itself to take the issue of compe-
tency or irresponsibility to the jury. See note 76 infra. But cf. H. WEIIHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 227 n.6 (1954).
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be sued, to drive, to vote, to be a juror, to be a doctor, to raise
children and to stand criminal trial.23 A person may thus at the same
time be competent for some legal purposes and incompetent for
others.24
In general, these competency tests do not contain the phrase "men-
tal disease" or its synonyms. This can be illustrated by two typical
competency tests-competency to contract and competency to stand
criminal trial.
The traditional common law standard for competency to contract
provides:2 5
To have the mental capacity to contract it is necessary that a person
have the ability to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which
he is engaged and to understand its quality and consequences.
One court has stated explicitly that there need not be a finding of the
cause of the inability to understand the contract. 26 However, most
courts reach the same result implicitly by merely omitting reference
to mental illness or any other "cause" in formulating the test for inca-
pacity to contract.27 I have found no cases clearly mandating that a
trial court find that "mental disease" or some other "entity" was the
cause of the inability to comprehend the contract, although a few
cases ambiguously suggest such a requirement.28 In the few states which
23. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL
INCOMPETENCY 260-369 (1968), discusses these tests of competency as well as others.
24. Jd. at 291.
25. Kruse v. Coos Head Timber Co., 248 Ore. 294, 432 P.2d 1009, 1015 (1967)
(emphasis added); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 256 (3d ed. 1959).
26. "We are not concerned with what impairs capacity." Star Realty, Inc. v. Bower,
17 Mich. App. 248, 169 N.W.2d 194, 199 (1969). The court affirmed the trial court's
denial of specific performance of a real estate contract because the defendant was in-
competent. There was testimony that the defendant suffered from a "nervous condition"
but none about "mental illness."
27. See, e.g., Board of Regents of Univ. of Texas v. Yarbrough, 470 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971); Harris v. Rivard, 64 Wn. 2d 173, 390 P.2d 1004, 1005-06 (1964). As
an example of another cause, courts in general do not require a finding that voluntary
intoxication was the cause of the inability to understand the transaction. See, e.g., Olsen
v. Hawkins, 90 Idaho 28, 408 P.2d 462 (1965). Courts generally treat incapacity to con-
tract caused by intoxication the same as any other incapacity. See, e.g., id.; Peterson v.
Eritsland, 69 Wn. 2d 588, 419 P.2d 332, 336 (1966); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§
249-263 (3d ed. 1959).
28. See, e.g., Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W.2d 721, 723
(1950):
To avoid the contract it must appear not only that Sterling was of unsound mind
when it was made but that this unsoundness was such that he had no reasonable
perception of the nature and terms of the contract.
Mahin v. Soshnik, 148 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 1958); Sosik v. Conlon, 91 R.I. 439, 164
A.2d 696 (1960). But cf. Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 206, 303
741
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have enacted statutes pertaining to competency to contract, the courts
have simply read the common law test into the general language of the
statutes.2 9 Surprisingly, the proposed Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts departs from the common law rule by including the causal re-
quirement of "mental illness or defect" in its test of contractual capa-
city.30 Yet the Restatement Comments give no reason for diverging from
the common law. Nor is there any indication that the drafters recognized
that they were abrogating the majority common law rule. This may
illustrate the point made earlier that legalists have a confused concep-
tion of "mental illness," believing it accurately describes a cause for
the incapacity, when actually it is more nearly a vague and
value-loaded synonym for incapacity.
Interestingly, the American Law Institute made the same kind of an
unacknowledged change in its test for competency to stand criminal
trial. The traditional common law test is whether the defendant has
the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist his at-
torney.31 The standard contains no mention of "mental disease" or
N.Y.S.2d 362, 370, 250 N.E.2d 460, 466 (1969); Fingerhut v. Kralyn Enterprises, Inc.,
71 Misc. 2d 846, 337 N.Y.S.2d 394, 400, 405 (Sup. Ct. 1971). In Ortelere the court or-
dered that on remand the trial court not limit itself to competency to contract under the
traditional "cognitive" test of competency "to comprehend and understand the nature of
the transaction." Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 303 N.Y.S.2d
362, 366, 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1969). The trial court must also consider competency
pursuant to a new test, apparently whether the contract was made "solely as a result of
serious mental illness, namely, psychosis." Id. at 206, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370, 250 N.E.2d
at 466. The court limited the new test as follows: "Of course, nothing less serious than
medically classified psychosis should suffice or else few contracts would be invulnerable
to some kind of psychological attack." Id.
29. See, e.g., Matthews v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 392 P.2d 369, 373 (Okla. 1964)
apparently construing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 16, 22, 23 (1966).
30. (1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a trans-
action if by reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and conse-
quences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and
the other party has reason to know of his condition.
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without knowl-
edge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance under subsection (1)
terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in whole or in part
or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be inequitable. In such
a case a court may grant relief on such equitable terms as the situation requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) (emphasis
added).
31. See Rex v. Dyson, 7 C. & P. 305 (1831) (deaf-mute held incompetent to stand
criminal trial); State v. Mahaffey, 3 Wn. App. 988, 478 P.2d 787 (1970). At least one
commentator has concluded that "mental illness" is part of the common law standard
for competency to stand trial, basing this conclusion on cases holding that persons suf-
fering from amnesia must stand criminal trial. The author makes the questionable as-
sumption that amnesia is not mental illness. Note, Amnesia: A Case Stady in the Limits
742
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any other cause of the incapacity. When statutes provide that "insane"
persons shall not stand trial, the courts construe "insane" to be a legal
term which merely codifies the previous common law incapacity test.
They do not require a finding of "mental illness" or other cause of the
incapacity.32 However, the Model Penal Code reverses this approach
and requires the trier of fact to find not only that the defendant "lacks
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his
own defense," but also that such incapacity is "a result of mental dis-
ease or defect."3 3 The Model Penal Code Comments indicate neither
awareness of this divergence from the traditional criteria nor explana-
tion for it.34 In fact, under recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, the common law test omitting a causal requirement for the inca-
pacity may be mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.35 Under these cases, a state is arguably prohibited from
forcing trial on a criminal defendant who is without capacity to assist
of Particular Justice, 71 YALE LJ. 109, 115-118 (1961). A better view of the amnesia
cases is that they turn on the ability to assist counsel. These cases suggest that the law
analogizes the person suffering from amnesia to the person who was so drunk at the
time of the criminal act that he did not know what was going on and to the person whose
key alibi witness is dead. In each of these cases the defendant is in some sense deprived
of evidence he might have had, but at the time of trial he is fully able to understand the
charges against him and to communicate with his counsel about how to conduct his de-
fense.
32. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, 94 P.2d 559, 564-565 (1939), con-
struing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1367-68 (West 1970). Other states have repeated the
common law test in their codes:
If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to under-
stand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued
on the ground of the insanity of the defendant.
IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971).
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For examples of stat-
utes substantially adopting the Model Penal Code formulation including the "mental
disease or defect" language, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.100 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1621(A) (Supp. 1972).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
35. In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court reversed a federal conviction on the issue of competency to stand trial and stated
that on remand:
[T] he "test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to con-
sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him."
Id. Although the Dusky opinion did not indicate whether this test is grounded on a
statute or on the constitution, the Eighth Circuit construed it to establish a federal con-
stitutional standard. Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 853 (1966). At any rate the Dusky standard may have been raised to a consti-
tutional status by Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Pate held that a state convic-
tion violated the due process clause because the state had failed to hold a hearing on the
defendant's competency to stand criminal trial although the evidence before the trial
judge had suggested doubts about the defendant's competency.
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counsel or understand the trial. The added Model Penal Code require-
ment of "mental illness or defect" is either unconstitutional or redun-
dant.
In the light of the above illustrations from contractual and criminal
law, we can begin to evaluate the traditional position of excluding
"mental illness" from competency tests: if a person does not have the
ability to understand what he is doing, it does not serve any obvious
legal purpose to make his legal position turn on whether "mental ill-
ness" caused the incapacity.36
For example, if a person lacks the capacity to understand the na-
ture of the contract he is signing, requiring the trier of fact to identify
"mental disease" as the causative factor accomplishes no surface
objective of contract law. To be sure, one incidental purpose of
making "mental disease" a partof the contractual capacity test may
be to exclude incapacities caused by the voluntary intoxication of the
incapacitated party.37 However, the exclusion of voluntary intoxica-
tion can be achieved more precisely by explicitly excluding incapacities
caused by voluntary intoxication from the general standard than by
incorporating "mental illness" into that standard.
Similarly, there appears to be no obvious reason for making incom-
petency to stand trial turn on a finding of "mental disease or defect." 38
The surface implication of such a requirement is that there are de-
fendants who must stand trial if for reasons other than "mental illness
or defect" they are unable to assist their attorneys or understand the
proceedings.39 But to force such defendants to trial would defeat the
36. Under the few competency tests focusing on capacity to control rather than ca-
pacity to comprehend, a required causative finding of "mental illness" indicates that the
lack of control must derive from internal causes. The term "mental illness" excludes an
external cause such as duress which is governed by other legal rules. See RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS §§ 492-99 (1932). Both Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d
196, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 250 N.E.2d 460 (1969), supra note 28, and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964), supra, note 30, added a "mental
illness" causal requirement when they joined a control test to the traditional cognitive
test of competency to contract. Duress would typically affect ability to control but not
ability to understand.
37. The proposed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18D (Tent. Draft No. I,
1964) establishes a separate test for the incompetency of intoxicated persons. If a party
"is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the
transaction" "by reason of intoxication," then the contract is voidable "if the other party
has reason to know" of the disability. Id. This knowledge requirement does not limit the
voidability if such inability was "by reason of mental illness or defect." Id. § 18C.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) requires such a
finding.
39. If there are no such defendants, then the requirement of "mental disease or de-
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purposes of the competency to stand trial requirement. For instance,
the defendant's competency increases the accuracy of the guilt deter-
mining process. At least it is unclear what legal purpose is achieved by
theoretically dividing all defendants who are unable to understand the
proceedings or assist their counsel into two groups, the mentally ill
and the mentally healthy, with trial postponed for one but not the
other. More likely the tail will wag the dog: the term "mental illness"
will not limit the category of persons found incompetent to stand trial,
but rather whoever is found incompetent to stand trial for any reason
will be deemed "mentally ill" by definition. Given the questionable
nature of the "mental illness" concept, use of such a standard by legal
forums raises the question of possible "hidden" functions performed
by a "mental illness" requirement in competency proceedings. 40
B. Insanity Defense Tests
In contrast to the competency area, "mental disease" has tradition-
ally been a part of insanity standards governing criminal responsi-
bility. The leading nineteenth century M'Naghten's Case41 established
a responsibility standard incorporating "disease of the mind" which is
still widely followed: 42
[I] t must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the
act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
Those courts adding the "irresistible impulse" test to the M'Naghten
standard have required the defendant's inability to control himself to
fect" is at least superficially unnecessary. I have found no cases involving incompetency
to stand trial based on intoxication. Even if the defendant's incapacity were due to his
own voluntary intoxication, waiting for the defendant to sober up would serve legal
purposes such as maximizing the accuracy of the legal process. If such a case arose in a
state which had adopted the Model Penal Code, the defendant could presumably be
found incompetent under a residual common law incompetency to stand trial test that
had not been entirely superseded by the Model Penal Code. The following cases in-
volving intoxicated or otherwise drugged criminal defendants raise related legal argu-
ments: People v. Martin, 203 Misc. 876, 119 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Monroe County Ct. 1953);
State v. Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98 (C.P. Franklin County 1969); State v. Murphy, 56 Wn.
2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960); State v. Maryott, 6 Wn. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971).
40. See Section III, Functions of Mental Illness as a Legal Fiction, infra.
41. 10 CI. & F. 200,8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1943).
42. Id. at 208, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
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"be the result of a disease"43 or even "to have been the product of [a
"mental disease"] solely."44 Statutes codifying the M'Naghten and irre-
sistible impulse standards have tended to retain the "mental disease"
requirement. 45 The Model Penal Code irresponsibility defense, a vari-
ation of M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse, continues the "mental
disease" prerequisite: 46
Section 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct."
Section 2.08. Intoxication.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the
meaning of Section 4.01.
In the irresponsibility defense area, as elsewhere, the courts have
not defined "mental disease." Nevertheless, judges have assigned a few
functions to it. The social connotations of the term "mental disease"
suggest incapacity.47 But unlike the competency standards, the
M'Naghten criteria for criminal responsibility do not mention the "ca-
pacity," "ability," or "power" of the defendant. Thus, the "disease of
the mind" phrase apparently performs the same function in the
M'Naghten rules that these other terms would perform if they were ac-
43. People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487,29 N.W. 109, 112 (1886).
44. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1886).
45. Ch. 44, § 1, [1972] Colo. Laws. 288; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (Supp.
1972). The responsibility defense codified in Georgia retains a requirement of "men-
tal disease, injury or congenital deficiency" as the cause for "a delusional compulsion as
to such act which overmastered [defendant's] will to resist...," but omits any such
prerequisite as the cause for lack of "mental capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong." GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-702 to 26-704 (1972).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08, 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis
added).
47. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. The phrase "defect of reason" in
M'Naghten may also suggest incapacity or inability. See H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING
OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 198 (1972).
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tually expressed: in addition to not knowing that his acts were wrong,
a defendant must be incapable of knowing they were wrong.48 In the
analogous situation of competency to contract, a person who neglects
to read a contract before signing it may not know its nature and con-
sequences, but he is not incompetent to contract since he had the
ability to know. Since the contractual tests are expressly framed in
terms of ability or capacity to know, there is no need for them to refer
to "mental disease." Similarly under a responsibility test like the
Model Penal Code which contains the word "capacity," the require-
ment of "mental disease or defect" becomes redundant insofar as its
function is to indicate a lack of capacity.
But the "mental disease" phrase does more than merely suggest that
the defendant must be incapacitated, not merely indisposed. The term
"mental disease" (as in the competency standards) excludes incapacities
caused by the defendant's voluntary acts, at least when the acts are
not too remote in time.49 For example, courts deciding cases under
M'Naghten have held that states of mind caused by voluntary intoxi-
cation were as a matter of law not caused by a disease of the mind. 50
However, the same courts have blurred this "rule" that voluntary in-
toxication is not a "mental disease" by creating a second "rule" that
"mental disease" caused by intoxication can support the insanity de-
fense.51 It is not clear how these two "rules" mesh. Possibly some
courts mean that a state of mind caused by intoxication will be
deemed a mental disease if it results in part from a voluntary act from
the remote past but not if it results only from a voluntary act from the
48. "Disease of the mind" seems to be performing some function because, theoreti-
cally, if "disease of the mind" were deleted from the M'Naghten test every defendant
who made an unreasonable mistake of fact causing him to believe his act was justified
might claim he lacked criminal responsibility because he did not know his act was
wrong. The "defect of reason" language could pose problems for such a claim unless the
phrase were read to mean mistake in reasoning.
49. Incapacities caused 6y the defendant's voluntary acts could be explicitly ex-
cluded from the criminal responsibility defense thus avoiding the semantic and concep-
tual confusion inherent in the phrase "mental illness."
50. See, e.g., Salter v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 482, 264 S.W.2d 719 (1953).
The Model Penal Code basically codifies the common law in this respect. It states that
"intoxication" rather than "voluntary intoxication" is not a "mental disease or defect,"
but it provides that "involuntary intoxication" will exculpate to the same extent that a
"mental disease or defect" will. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08, 4.01 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 393, 364 P.2d 159, 164 (1961); Griffin v.
State, 96 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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immediate past.52 Alternatively, the rules may merely reflect the con-
fused concept of "mental disease" held by many judges.
In addition to excluding voluntary intoxication from insanity de-
fense, the courts have also excluded "frenzies" from the defense:
"Frenzy arising solely from the passions of anger or jealousy, no
matter how furious, is not insanity." 53 Any meaningful distinction
between a "furious frenzy" and "insanity" (or mental disease) may be
illusory. Insofar as "mental disease" has any accepted psycho-dynamic
connotations, it describes a disorganization of the ego in the face of
uncontrollable unconscious forces.54 A "furious frenzy" would seem to
describe such a disorganization. However, the courts may believe that
sometimes a defendant who is incapable of knowing his act was wrong
could have voluntarily prevented himself from getting worked up into
that incapacity. The courts may label a frenzy resulting from such a
voluntary omission of the defendant a mere "furious frenzy" and a
frenzy which the defendant could not prevent a "mental disease," es-
pecially in view of the general connotations of "mental disease" as
something beyond the defendant's responsibility. Alternatively, the
"furious frenzy" limitation may mean that the phrase "mental illness"
requires that the defendant's mental disturbance be major rather than
minor and prolonged rather than ephemeral. 55
The phrase "mental disease" more broadly suggests that the causes
of a defendant's inability to control himself must be internal rather
than external. It purports to require that the defendant's own personality
be the source of his control difficulties. The "mental illness" require-
ment thus precludes use of the irresponsibility defense by a defendant
whose inability to comply with the law stems solely from an attack or
threat by another person. Such claims must instead be tested under
separate standards such as self-defense or duress. Since such external
52. See Salter v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 482, 264 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1953); State v.
Rio, 38 Wn. 2d 446, 230 P.2d 308, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951). A court could pos-
sibly analogize a case of heroin addiction to either of these "rules." In State v. White, 27
N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958), the court held that heroin withdrawal is not a "mental dis-
ease" for insanity defense purposes. It is not clear from the case whether this was true as
a matter of law or only because no doctor testified that heroin withdrawal is a "mental
disease."
53. Gruetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94, 105-106 (1879) (the quotation is a jury instruction
that was upheld over defendant's exception); accord, Ruffin v. State, 123 A.2d 461, 464
(Del. 1956).
54. See, e.g., Kubie, The Fundamental Nature of the Distinction Between Nor-
mality and Neurosis, 23 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 167 (1954).
55. See Barbour v. State, 262 Ala. 193, 78 So. 2d 328, 330 (1954).
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causes do not eliminate a defendant's capacity to understand but only
his capacity to control, cognitive tests such as M'Naghten in effect ex-
clude such causes apart from the term "mental disease."
The phrase "mental illness" does not serve any obvious purpose of
the criminal law in determining which defendants should be held
criminally responsible for their acts. In the language of the Model
Penal Code, if a defendant involuntarily "lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law,"56 he is not a proper subject for
criminal punishment whether or not he meets the Code's added re-
quirement of "mental disease or defect." He is not deterrable if he
meets such criteria: a threat of punishment cannot deter a person from
violating a rule if the person lacks the ability either to understand that
he is violating the rule or to comply with the rule. Similarly, retribu-
tion is inappropriate for a person who meets such criteria: it is unfair
and unjust to threaten punishment for rule-breaking if a person
cannot comply with the rules. The state may be justified in incapaci-
tating or "rehabilitating" the defendant, but this could be accom-
plished by "civil" intervention which eschews the intentional infliction
of penalties whether or not he is labelled "mentally ill."
Only one court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, has attempted to give a legal definition of "mental dis-
ease." In Durham v. United States57 the court placed an unsupport-
able weight on the ambiguous "mental disease" concept when it
adopted as its criminal responsibility test whether or not the "unlawful
act was the product of a mental disease or defect." The court came to
recognize that "mental disease or defect" had no accepted psychiatric
meaning and thereupon established a legal definition in McDonald v.
United States:58
[T] he jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any
abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.
One problem with the McDonald definition is that it merely substi-
tutes one undefined causal mental condition for another. Both "mental
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), quoted in text ac-
companying note 46 supra.
57. 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
58. 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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disease or defect" and "abnormal condition of the mind" leave open
the normative problem of what criteria determine what is normal and
abnormal. Also, the definition suggests that the court could find no
advantage in the "mental disease" concept beyond the often consi-
dered factors of "knowledge" (both cognitive and emotional) and
"control." Many other jurisdictions, as well as the Model Penal Code,5 9
have set forth the "knowledge" and "control" requirements as additions
to the causal requirement of "mental disease," implying that the "men-
tal disease" requirement has some independent significance. In contrast,
the District of Columbia merely detoured the "knowledge" and "con-
trol" factors through the definition of "mental disease." In United States
v. Brawner,60 the District of Columbia recently replaced the Durham
test with the Model Penal Code test but retained the McDonald defi-
nition of "mental disease or defect" and left "abnormal condition of
the mind" undefined. This established largely61 redundant tests for the
"knowledge" and "control" aspects of criminal responsibility.
What does the phrase "mental illness" contribute to the irresponsi-
bility defense? The question remains unanswered. Attempting to give
any legal definition to "mental disease" unnecessarily confuses juries
and psychiatric witnesses, not to mention lawyers, because any legal
definition is overwhelmed by the medical connotations of the term.
Thus courts and legislatures62 have sometimes indicated what is not a
59. MODEL PENAL CODE. § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), quoted in text ac-
companying note 46 supra. For an example of a statute patterned on the Model Penal
Code formulation, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
60. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Brawner is the one decision which has explicitly
considered dropping a "mental disease" causal requirement from the criminal responsi-
bility test:
Finally, we have not accepted suggestions to adopt a rule that disentangles the in-
sanity defense from a medical model, and announces a standard exculpating any-
one whose capacity for control is insubstantial, for whatever cause or reason.
There may be logic in these submissions, but we are not sufficiently certain of the
nature, range and implications of the conduct involved to attempt an all-embracing
unified field theory. The applicable rule can be discerned as the cases arise in re-
gard to other conditions-somnambulism or other automatisms; blackouts due,
e.g. to overdose of insulin; drug addiction. Whether these somatic conditions
should be governed by a rule comparable to that herein set forth for mental disease
would require, at a minimum, a judicial determination, which takes medical
opinion into account, finding convincing evidence of an ascertainable condition
characterized by "a broad consensus that free will does not exist."
Id. at 995.
61. The McDonald test focuses on whether the defendant has mental or control
problems generally whereas the Model Penal Code test focuses more particularly on the
defendant's knowledge and control capacities with respect to the alleged criminal act.
62. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1964) ("The terms 'mental disease'
or 'mental defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
conduct or excessive use of drugs or alcohol.")
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mental disease. However, they have generally not given a positive
definition of the concept. Perhaps they have not because the phrase
serves no evident legal purpose.
C. Other Tests of Mental Capacity
The same issues created by the phrase "mental illness" in compe-
tency and irresponsibility tests also exist in other legal tests of mental
capacity. Does the particular test incorporate a causal requirement of
"mental illness"? If it does, is "mental illness" defined by reference to
legal or psychiatric guidelines? What are the guidelines? These ques-
tions inhere in mental capacity tests in areas such as the following:
partial responsibility for crime, commitment and release of criminal
defendants who are incompetent to stand trial, commitment and re-
lease of criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity,
general civil commitment and release, commitment and release of
sexual psychopaths, insanity as grounds for divorce, insanity as a di-
vorce defense, insanity as a tort defense, insanity justifying a special
standard for contributory negligence, mental illness caused by torts
justifying increased damage claims, mental illness as a basis for health
insurance claims, and insanity as a basis for sterilization.63 It is be-
yond the scope of this article to develop the "mental illness" issues
peculiar to each of these other tests of mental capacity. However, the
following discussion of the surreptitious impact of "mental illness" is
relevant to any legal test containing this apparitional phrase.
III. FUNCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
AS A LEGAL FICTION
A legal fiction was created when psychiatrists abandoned the notion
that all defendants could be classified as either mentally ill or mentally
healthy on the basis of brain physiology. From that time on the "men-
tally ill man," like the notorious "reasonable man," has been a fic-
tional model of man whose retention can be justified only by the
worth of the legal purposes it serves. Yet "mental illness" neither has
an accepted meaning nor furthers any apparent legal purposes, aside
63. For a general introduction to the variety of mental incapacity tests, see THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds., rev. ed. 197 1).
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from its rather awkward exclusions of a party's voluntary incapacities.
But below the surface there are substantial, if only barely visible and
perhaps unintended, consequences of the law's continued reliance on
"mental illness." Let us shift our focus toward the subsurface impact
of the phrase "mental illness" on the trial process.
At the trial stage, the inclusion of the term "mental illness" as part
of the substantive standard affects both the nature of expert testimony
and the interaction between expert witnesses, the judge and the jury. It
tends to legitimize physicians as the best qualified witnesses on the
issue of who meets a particular standard. A lay witness may seem
competent to give opinion testimony as to whether the ordinary de-
fendant had the ability to understand the nature and consequences of
a transaction. 64 But the medical connotations of "mental illness" sug-
gest the preeminince of tesifying physicians on the questions of
whether the defendant had a "mental illness" and whether he was
unable to understand the transaction as a result of this "illness." 65
The fictional concept "mental illness" tends to disparage the testi-
mony of psychologists as well as lay witnesses. A Ph.D. clinical psy-
chologist may be an expert on the mind and he may have much more
academic knowledge and clinical training in human behavior than the
typical nonpsychiatric physician. But unlike the physician, the psy-
chologist does not have expertise in "diagnosing" "illnesses." Perhaps
for this reason some courts have stated that psychologists, unlike psy-
chiatrists, are not allowed to testify on the ultimate question of
whether the defendant was mentally responsible for his criminal con-
duct.66
The presence of "mental illness" in the substantive standard influ-
ences the nature of the testimony as well as who testifies. From the
64. See, e.g., Both v. Nelson, 31111. 2d 511, 202 N.E.2d 494 (1964).
In Both, a testamentary capacity case, the court reversed the trial court for refusing to
give the following instruction requested by defendant:
[W] hile physicians are better qualified to testify to a diseased condition than are
laymen, their testimony upon the subject of the mental capacity of an individual
whom they have been privileged to observe is not entitled to any greater weight
than that of laymen.
Id. at 496.
65. See, e.g., id.; Frisone v. United States, 270 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1959):
But testimony as to existence or treatment of a mental illness serious enough to
cause permanent memory impairment falls clearly outside the area of common
knowledge and within the area where expert testimony is required.
66. See, e.g., Sherrill v. State, 286 A.2d 528, 534 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972). See
generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 919 (1961).
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lawyer's standpoint, the best possible evidence that a defendant does
or does not have a "mental disease" is expert conclusory opinion testi-
mony. Since "mental disease" is a legal fiction which has no accepted
meaning, its meaning cannot be readily inferred by the judge or jury
from expert or lay testimony about underlying psychic phenomena or
observed behavior. Thus the "mental disease" requirement increases
the tendency of lawyers to ask questions of psychiatrists that call for
answers in the conclusory language of the substantive test. This mag-
nifies the tendency of psychiatric witnesses to apply conclusory labels
such as "mental disease" or "schizophrenia" and to neglect data on
the defendant's background and personality structure.
The testifying psychiatrist is presented with a dilemma when a
lawyer asks him if a person has a "mental disease." He probably real-
izes that there is neither any accepted psychiatric definition of "mental
disease" nor even any agreed-on psychiatric guidelines for determining
what is a "mental disease." He may therefore assume that "mental dis-
ease" is legal jargon which serves legal purposes. When asked for an
opinion, he may define the phrase by attempting to ascertain the pur-
poses of the law in the light of his own personal values. In other words,
his answer is subjective and result oriented. For example, in a civil com-
mitment hearing a psychiatrist's definition of "mental illness" will
depend on how he balances the values of liberty, the safety of the
community, and involuntary psychiatric treatment. Similarly, in in-
sanity defense proceedings, a psychiatrist believing law violators
should be punished may limit "mental illness" to "psychoses" while
one believing punishment is unproductive in achieving compliance
with the law may expand it to include "personality disorders." Thus,
testifying psychiatrists attempt to define "mental illness" by reference
to legal and social rather than medical guidelines.67 Yet at the same
time, the medical connotations of "disease" cause lawyers to assume
falsely that in legal tests the term "mental disease" has a medically
accepted meaning. This terminological confusion exacerbates the gen-
eral tendency of psychiatric witnesses and lawyers to misunderstand
each other. 68
67. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
68. See, e.g., A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 310 (1968); Roberts, Some
Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 240, 246;
Vann & Morganroth, Psychiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. DETROIT
L. REv. 75, 84-85 (1964).
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The confusion created by "mental illness" also extends to the trier
of fact. The mere vagueness of the term "mental illness" has some
impact on the fact finder.69 A requirement that the jury find a defendant
"mentally ill" increases the jury's discretion. The law grants such dis-
cretionary powers whenever it mandates that ajury or judge find "facts"
such as negligence, proximate cause or best interests of the child which,
like "mental illness," are invariably policy judgments rather than
resolutions of what happened or existed. In the area of legal incapaci-
ties such increased discretion seems minimal because the whole inca-
pacity standard is already indefinite.70 For example, the test of whether a
person "is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
consequences" of a transaction is already so imprecise that the fact
finder has almost unlimited discretion even before adding "mental ill-
ness or defect" to it. 7 1 Similarly, "mental disease or defect" can hardly
increase the haziness of the Model Penal Code's irresponsibility de-
fense requirements of "substantial capacity... to appreciate" and
"substantial capacity... to conform. ' 72
But the many connotations of "mental illness" have an impact on
judges and juries far beyond mere vagueness. The medical connota-
tions tend to increase the deference paid by judges and juries to med-
ical witnesses and to their conclusory opinions. They naturally assume
that a physician is a better judge than they about what is "illness,"
who is "ill," and what kinds of incompetency and irresponsibility are
"caused" by "mental illness." This deference to an assumed medical
meaning is reinforced by the failure of the law to define "mental dis-
ease." Yet, as indicated above, the testifying psychiatrists, in defining
"mental illness," have necessarily resorted to legal and social criteria.
Thus in irresponsibility defense cases, for example, commentators
may state that the purpose of the vague criteria is to give great discre-
tion to the jury to determine who is morally culpable.7 3 However, the
69. The vagueness of "mental disease" adds to the potential constitutional problems
of void for vagueness and improper delegation of powers created by the vagueness of
other commitment criteria. Such constitutional problems are beyond the scope of this
article.
70. For a discussion of various incapacity standards, see Section II, Legal Stan-
dards Containing "Mental Disease," supra.
71. The quoted language is from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964), supra note 30.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), quoted in text ac-
companying note 46 supra.
73. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 159 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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medical aura of the term "mental illness" increases the tendency of the
jury to pass the actual determination of community morals on to the
psychiatrists.
Yet the delegation of moral and legal determinations to testifying
physicians is achieved surreptitiously. The scientific aura of "mental
illness" suggests that physicians are making a scientific rather than a
social judgment. The term "mental illness" tends to mask not only the
discretion delegated to judges and juries but also the discretion they in
turn delegate de facto to medical witnesses. If juries need only find
that the defendant did not have the capacity to conform his conduct
to the law, they may realize the inherent tenuousness of any expert
opinion. If they must also find from the expert testimony that "mental
illness" caused the incapacity to conform, the connotations of "illness"
falsely suggest that now the physician's opinion is more precisely sci-
entific.
This delegation of moral and legal decisions to psychiatrists might
not survive if it were not hidden. In the District of Columbia the dele-
gation to doctors was exposed when a psychiatrist testified that origi-
nally psychopathy had not been a "mental disease" for insanity de-
fense purposes but became one when the St. Elizabeth's Hospital Staff
decided that future staff testimony should treat it as such.74 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia eventually responded by at-
tempting to adopt a legal definition for "mental disease or defect" and
thus remove the physician's ability to make such a policy judgment for
the court.75
The connotations of "mental disease" may also make it easier for
the trier of fact to find that the rest of the standard has been met in
incapacity hearings. A jury may find it very difficult to decide if a de-
fendant had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. But if
they first find, on the basis of "scientific" testimony, that the defendant
had a "mental illness," then they may assume that the defendant could
not control his behavior because of the common supposition that the
"mentally ill" cannot control their conduct.76 Similarly, in civil com-
74. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., con-
curring).
75. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850-851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
76. Compare the practice of District of Columbia under the Durham rule: "The in-
troduction of competent evidence of mental disorder raises the issue of causality suffi-
cient for jury consideration." McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850 (1962).
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mitment cases, the pluralistic presumption that the mentally ill are
dangerous may mean that a judge upon finding "mental illness" will
assume dangerousness. Thus a finding of "mental disease" may make
it psychologically easier for the judge or jury to assume incapacity or
irresponsibility. It may divert their attention from a lack of inde-
pendent facts supporting required consequential findings such as dan-
gerousness.
So far we have seen that as a theoretical matter, "mental illness"
does not help the law determine whom to deem incompetent or irre-
sponsible, but as a practical matter it has several consequences on the
trial processes by which such determinations are made. But the pres-
ence of "mental illness" in such standards is much more far reaching.
It influences not just trial processes but also pre-trial and post-trial
procedures.
At the pre-trial stage, the terin "mental illness" in pertinent capacity
standards supports the employment of medical personnel and proce-
dures. The designation "mental illness" also facilitates the assumption
that traditional legal protections such as the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to bail are inapplicable to mental
examinations prior to judicial hearings on a defendant's irresponsi-
bility or competency to stand criminal trial.
Ordinarily the prosecution must prove the state of the defendant's
mind at the time of the crime without forcing the defendant to tell
what was in his mind.77 However, many courts have held that a de-
fendant must answer questions during a psychiatric examination to
determine whether he meets the insanity defense.78 One basis em-
ployed by courts for reconciling such psychiatric questioning with the
privilege against self-incrimination is to classify a defendant's state-
ments in a psychiatric examination as "real evidence" as opposed to
"testimonial evidence. '7 9 The Supreme Court has held that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination allows the state to force the defendant
to produce "real" or nontestimonial evidence, such as blood80 and
handwriting exemplars, 81 and only prohibits the compelled production
77. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969); Note, Requiring a
Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REv. 648, 649-50 (1970).
79. See, e.g., Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 820-21 (Fla. 1970); 8 J. WIGMORE.
EVIDENCE 399 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
80. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
81. United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973).
756
Vol. 48: 735, 1973
Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction
of "testimonial" evidence. This tendency of courts to classify state-
ments by the allegedly insane as "real" evidence finds support in the
entity theory of "mental illness." If "insanity" is seen as a disease of
the brain, or if "mental illness" is seen as a thing which inhabits the
defendant, then it is easier for courts to perceive a psychiatric exami-
nation as a search for mere verbal symptoms rather than as normal
communication. Although such an "infestation"8 2 theory of "mental
illness" has been abandoned outside the law, the law perpetuates this
image of "mental illness" as an underlying malady when it postulates
"mental illness" as "cause" of a defendant's inability to know right
from wrong. Thus the reification of "mental illness" in the irresponsi-
bility test is a fiction serving to avoid the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Ordinarily the criminal defendant has a right to be free on bail
pending trial.8 3 However, in many jurisdictions defendants raising the
issues of competency to stand trial and irresponsibility have been au-
tomatically subjected to lengthy inpatient medical observation prior to
judicial decision of those issues.8 4 The connotations of "mental ill-
ness" facilitate the assumption that the examinations should be inpa-
tient and thus that freedom on bail pending trial would be inappro-
priate. The connotation of dangerousness associated with "mental ill-
ness" suggests the need for confining an alleged mentally ill person
pending trial. The notion that "illness" can best be cured in a hospital
setting implies that a "mentally ill" defendant will be helped by such
inpatient treatment in a mental hospital during the period of observa-
tion. The presence of "mental illness" in the capacity tests thus fosters
denial of the right to freedom on bail without ever explicitly focusing
on why that right should be abrogated.
For the same reasons the inclusion of "mental illness" in a capacity
82. This infestation or "devil-possession" theory, this ontological conception of
mental disease as a thing present or-not present in the individual, is an erroneous,
medieval and pre-medieval concept which persists in the minds of many laymen,
not a few lawyers, and even a few physicians in spite of all sorts of effort to elimi-
nate it.
Menninger, Community Attitudes Vis-a-Vis the Offender, in ABA SECnONS OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS 83, 85 (1958).
83. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1005 (2d ed. 1969).
84. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE
ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE TRIAL, 31-33, 55, 104-107 (1966); cf. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
757
Washington Law Review
standard also helps to justify hospitalization after the judicial hearing
if the defendant is found incapacitated. Of course, a finding of
"mental illness" is not a prerequisite to hospitalization. In fact, one
traditional practice has been for states automatically to hospitalize
criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial even though a
causal requirement of mental illness was not incorporated into the
competency to stand trial test.8 5 Nevertheless, a finding of "mental ill-
ness" with its associated connotations of dangerousness and need for
medical treatment makes hospital commitment appear to be a more
appropriate and inevitable disposition.
The connotations of "mental illness" augment the inclination of
lawyers and judges not to interfere with a hospital's custody of a de-
fendant. 86 These connotations suggest that the defendant is being
helped by hospital confinement and that the experts in "mental illness"
can best prescribe the appropriate "therapeutic" conditions. They also
suggest that psychiatrists are best able to determine when the "mental
illness" is "cured" and the defendant is ready for release. The implica-
tion that an underlying "mental illness" entity is continuing and may
be incurable serves to justify indefinite confinement of the "mentally
ill" without periodic judicial review of whether their mental condition
continues to meet the pertinent legal standard. 87 A similar judicial
predilection not to intervene might exist without the term "mental ill-
ness," but the phrase magnifies the tendency.
85. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733-34 (1972). In Jackson, the Court
held that the equal protection and due process clauses were violated when Indiana hospi-
talized the petitioner for three and one-half years as incompetent to stand criminal trial
when it appeared he would never become competent to stand trial.
The statute under which Jackson was confined established the following single stan-
dard governing both incompetency to stand trial and commitment as incompetent to
stand trial:
[Whether] the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of
the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his de-
fense ....
Id. at 717-18 n. 1. The statute uses the term "insanity" as a label for this test. Id. Because
"insanity" carries connotations of dangerousness and need for hospital treatment, its
usage functions implicitly to justify automatic hospitalization of persons found incom-
petent to stand trial.
86. On the general tendency of legal personnel to perceive hospitalized mental pa-
tients as de facto beyond the pale of the judicial system, see, e.g., R. ROCK, HOSPITALI-
ZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 238-39 (1968); J. KATZ, J.
GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 633-50, 713-24
(1948).
87. For examples of states with systems of indefinite civil commitment with no peri-
odic review, see THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 184-85 (S. Brakel & R. Rock
eds., rev. ed. 1971).
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Another post-trial consequence of including "mental illness" in a
legal standard is that it stigmatizes the person to whom it is attached.
A party is found "mentally ill" as well as incapacitated. He will hence-
forth carry the label "mentally ill" affixed by a court of law.88
In summary, the phrase "mental illness" lends a scientific aura to
vague and mythical legal processes. The term increases the tendency
of lawyers and laymen to defer to doctors-to escape problems by
leaving the "mentally ill" exclusively within the medical jurisdiction.
This deference has turned many judicial civil commitment hearings
into mere rubber stamps for psychiatric decisions. 89 Such rubber
stamp legal proceedings add formalities which legitimize psychiatric
decisions by furnishing an illusion of due process.90 The practice of
allowing doctors to confine the "mentally ill" without any judicial par-
ticipation is a more formal expression of the deferential tendency.91
But the term "mental illness" has subsurface effects not only on
legal procedures, but also on substantive legal doctrine. The very
mythical nature of the phrase "mental illness" tends to mystify any
substantive legal rule containing it. It also mystifies the relationship of
that rule to analogous rules. For example, the term "mental illness"
blurs the relationship between the standards governing insanity as a
divorce defense and other divorce standards, as this author demon-
strated in an earlier article. 92
Similarly, in criminal law a haze surrounds the insanity defense and
the way it fits into general criminal law doctrine.93 In particular the
88. The term "mental illness" contributes not only to the social stigma but also to
the legal "stigma" flowing from ajudicial finding of incapacity. For example, according
to the "presumption of insanity" doctrine, ajudicial finding that a person is incapacitated
under one legal test generally creates a presumption that the person is (and will con-
tinue to be) presumed incapacitated under other legal tests. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN. THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 115-20 (1967). The existence of "mental illness" in many capacity
tests helps courts justify both presuming one incapacity from another and assuming the
continuing existence of an underlying "disease" relevant to all incapacity tests.
89. See, e.g., T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 130-55
(1966); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 427-31 (1966).
90. See, e.g., id.; Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings,
57 Nw. U.L. REv. 383 (1962).
91. For discussions of hospitalization by medical certification, see THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 45-49, 57-59 (S. Brakel & R. Rock, eds., rev. ed. 1971); R. Rock,
HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 46-47, 199-213 (1968). Judicial
review is theoretically available but rarely sought.
92. See Hardisty, Insanity as a Divorce Defense, 12 J. FAM. L. 1, 12-23 (1972).
93. Even the relationship of the insanity defense to the basic criminal law concepts
of actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind) is obscure. Professor Williams be-
lieves that the insanity defense only negatives mens rea. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
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term "mental illness" helps both to distinguish the insanity defense
from other criminal law defenses and to avoid questions about justifi-
cations for differences between such defenses. For example, the Model
Penal Code specifies that to be exculpated for duress the defendant
must have been "coerced" to commit the criminal act "by the use of,
or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of
another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
have been unable to resist."94 In contrast, the control aspect of the
Model Penal Code irresponsibility defense eschews such limitations
and merely requires that the defendant "lacks substantial capacity . . .
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 95 Why should
the standards for incapacity to conform to the law be so much looser
in the irresponsibility defense than in the duress defense? The fictional
concept of a causal "mental illness" helps keep that question from
being asked. Even the Model Penal Code Comments merely attempt
to justify the difference by indicating that the irresponsibility defense
is based on a "mental disease or defect" which constitutes "a disability
that is both gross and verifiable. '96 Whatever else may be said about
the alleged referents of "mental illness," they are neither necessarily
"gross" 97 nor necessarily "verifiable." 98 A better explanation is that
only the insanity defense triggers automatic commitment. 99
Similarly, the phrase "mental illness" serves to cloud the relation-
ship between the insanity defense and the involuntary act defense. 100
It fosters the illusion that the line between the two defenses is sharp
LAW 482 (2d ed. 1961). In contrast, Professor Mueller states that it may negative the actus
reus as well. Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law of
Incapacity, 50 GEO. L.J. 105 (1961); cf. State v. Strasberg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020
(1910).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), quoted in text
accompanying note 46 supra.
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comment 6 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
97. See, e.g., L. SROLE, T. LANGNER, S. MICHAEL, M. OPLER & T. RENNIE, MENTAL
HEALTH IN THE METROPOLIS 135, 138 (1962). This study found that 81.5% of the persons
in a sample of Manhattan Island residents had consequential "symptoms of mental path-
ology." Id.
98. See, e.g., Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
99. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
100. Unlike a successful insanity defense, a successful involuntary act defense does
not automatically set off commitment procedures. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE 203-04 (1967). Moreover, the defendant may have more favorable burden of
proof rules under the involuntary act defense than under the insanity defense. Compare
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865, 871-73 (1948) with People v. Busby,
40 Cal. App. 2d 193, 104 P.2d 531, 536-37 (1940).
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whereas in fact it is shadowy. 01 Some courts have said that a criminal
act committed during an epileptic attack raises the involuntary act
defense.' 02 Others have stated that epilepsy is a "disease of the mind"
and therefore does not raise the involuntary act defense but only the
insanity defense. 103 All these courts merely apply the term "mental ill-
ness" as a label serving to announce a result. The label also shields
against an examination of the relationship between the two defenses.
The term "mental illness" similarly obfuscates civil commitment
standards. Why should we preventively detain certain dangerous per-
sons but not others? The term "mental illness" helps avoid this ques-
tion. Only the dangerous "mentally ill" are confined. 04 The conno-
tations of the phrase "mental illness" help justify institutionalization
of the "mentally ill" without further articulation of who is to be con-
fined or why.
CONCLUSION
The many legal difficulties created by the phrase "mental illness"
make its continued legal usage questionable. It has no accepted med-
ical meaning, and there are not even medical guidelines for estab-
lishing such a meaning. Any legal definition of the term is inherently
unsatisfactory since it retains its overlay of medical connotations in
the minds of all participants in the legal process. Legal usage of this
phantom concept exacerbates many problems surrounding psychi-
atric-legal proceedings. It aggravates interprofessional confusion since
lawyers assume "mental illness" is a medical phrase while testifying
doctors define it by reference to legal objectives. It increases the tend-
ency of psychiatric witnesses to present conclusory rhetoric instead of
underlying factual data. It contributes to psychiatric usurpation of
such legal tasks as judging the moral culpability of defendants under
the irresponsibility defense. It also legalizes the "devil-possession"
myth by postulating "mental illness" as a thing inhabiting a mentally
ill person and causing his behavior. "Mental illness" is a judicial label
creating stigmatization.
101. Cf. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 204 (1967).
102. See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
103. See, e.g., Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, [1961] 3 W.L.R.
965 (H.L.).
104. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-544(b) (1967).
761
Washington Law Review
In summary, we have determined what kind of an animal the law
has caught. The law has hooked a fish. The "mental illness" fish is re-
lated to the red herring because it distracts legal participants from the
pertinent legal issues. It is also akin to the cuttlefish because it makes
connected concepts opaque. Should not the law throw this fish back in
the sea?
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